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THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE: WHAT
DOES IT MEAN TO BE ESSENTIAL?
I. INTRODUCTION
If we truly learn everything we need to know in kindergarten, the
concept of sharing is fairly easy to understand. In the grown-up world
of antitrust law, however, the notion of "share and share alike" becomes
much more complicated.
The duty to share is mandated by the essential facilities doctrine.
This doctrine imposes on firms that control an essential facility, "the
obligation to make the facility available on non-discriminatory terms."'
In other words, if a court finds that a facility is essential, the court can
require the owner to provide equal access at fair prices to all those who
desire to use the facility.
2
A recent and important case involving essential facilities is Blue Cross
& Blue Shield v. Marshfield Clinic.3 Blue Cross argued that the
Marshfield Clinic4 and its doctors were essential facilities such that any
health maintenance organization (HMO) could demand access on fair
and equal terms.5 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
Marshfield Clinic and its doctors were not essential facilities.6 Conse-
quently, the Clinic had no duty to share its physicians with Blue Cross'
HMO, Compcare.7
While the essential facilities doctrine has received considerable
attention from courts and commentators,8 there is no precise definition
1. MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th
Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983) (citing United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S.
383, 410-11 (1912)). The Seventh Circuit held that AT&T denied MCI access to an essential
facility when AT&T refused to interconnect MCI to a local distribution network. MCI, 708
F.2d at 1132-33.
2. Id.
3. 65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996).
4. The Marshfield Clinic is located in Marshfield, WI. Although the town only has a
population of 20,000, the Marshfield Clinic employs over 400 doctors and is the fifth largest
physician-owned clinic in North America.
5. lId at 1413. The court stated that an "HMO provides medical services through
physicians with whom it has contracts specifying their compensation .... This means that the
HMO must be able to line up enough physicians with whom to contract to provide its
subscribers with a more or less complete menu of medical services." Id. at 1409.
6. Blue Cross, 65 F.3d at 1413.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Allen Kezsbom & Alan V. Goldman, No Shortcut to Antitrust Analysis: The
Twisted Journey of the "Essential Facilities" Doctrine, 1996 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1 (1996);
Scott D. Makar, The Essential Facility Doctrine and the Health Care Industry, 21 FLA. ST. U.L.
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of what the word essential means.9 Indeed, an essential facility has been
alternately defined as: the need of the public at large, the need of the
individual competitor, the market power possessed by the facility's
owner, and the preferences of consumers. Therefore, there is much
confusion about what makes a facility so essential that is must be shared.
This Comment attempts to delineate a uniform definition of what it
means to be essential. Part I explains why the four-part test for essential
facilities set out in MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co.,1° provides no help in defining just what it means to be essential.
Part II of this essay discusses the different approaches courts and
commentators use to characterize a facility as essential. In Part III, the
author argues that the term "essential" should only apply to those
facilities that are public necessities.
II. ESSENTIAL To WHOM? ESSENTIAL To WHAT?
In the MCI Communications case, the Seventh Circuit established
four elements that are necessary to prove liability under the doctrine of
essential facilities: "(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist;
(2) a competitor's inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the
essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor;
and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility.""1 This test neither
defines what the word "essential" means, nor describes any process for
determining which facilities should be subject to the test. The four
elements merely establish a threshold of "liability"'2 which allows a
court to impose the remedy of equal and fair access.
Notice that the MCI test contains a giant assumption. If one
examines the first and second elements, one notices immediately that the
test assumes that the facility in question is, in fact, essential. The MCI
REv. 913 (1994); Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles,
58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1990); David Reiffen & Andrew N. Kleit, Terminal Railroad
Revisited: Foreclosure of an Essential Facility or Simple Horizontal Monopoly?, 33 J.L. &
ECON. 419 (1990); James R. Ratner, Should There Be An Essential Facility Doctrine?, 21 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 327 (1988); David J. Gerber, Note, Rethinking the Monopolist's Duty to DeaL
A Legal and Economic Critique of the Doctrine of "Essential Facilities", 74 VA. L. REv. 1069
(1988); Gregory J. Werden, The Law and Economics of the Essential Facility Doctrine, 32 ST.
LoUIS L. 433 (1987); William B. Tye, Competitive Access: A Comparative Industry Approach
to the Essential Facility Doctrine, 8 ENERGY L.J. 337 (1987).
9. See Kezsbom & Golman, supra note 8, at 27 (arguing that courts have been exercising
substantial discretion in the definition of essentiality).
10. 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
11. Id. at 1132-33.
12. Ild.
[Vol. 80:11171118
THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE
test suffers from circular reasoning. A facility is deemed essential if it
satisfies the four elements. However, before one can satisfy the
elements, one must believe that the facility is essential in the first place.
Phillip Areeda notes that the trouble with the essential facilities
notion is that it begins "with the assumption that all business assets are
subject to sharing."13 Areeda wonders, "[d]o we really want to assume
that everything we have is up for grabs?"' 4 According to the MCI test,
it appears that everything is up for grabs and that every facility is
essential.
In his treatise on antitrust law, Herbert Hovenkamp lists three
categories of facilities, which the courts have found to be essential:
(1) natural monopolies or joint venture arrangements subject to
significant economies of scale; (2) structures, plants or other
valuable productive assets that were created as part of a regulato-
ry regime, whether or not they are properly natural monopolies
or (3) structures that are owned by the government and whose
creation or maintenance is subsidized."
Such a categorization is not helpful in determining what is essential.
Hovenkamp merely details those facilities which have created liability for
those who control them. This Comment takes one step back and tries
to determine what facilities are so essential that the four-part test should
be applied. Right now, the only limit on what is essential is the
creativity of the plaintiff's attorney who brings the action.
The essential facilities doctrine is a "circuit-generated"' 6 theory
which draws on four Supreme Court decisions for support.'7 None of
these four decisions, however, specifically address the doctrine of
essential facilities.'Y While the four-part test has found considerable
support in other circuits, the case law is inconsistent regarding what
13. Areeda, supra note 8, at 852 n.46.
14. Id
15. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND rrs PRACTICE § 7.7, 274 (1994).
16. Ratner, supra note 8, at 334.
17. Id See, eg., United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912); Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366,
reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 910 (1973); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing, 472 U.S. 585
(1985).
18. Ratner, supra note 8, at 334.
19. Four circuits have followed the four-part test in MCL See, eg., Willman v. Heartland
Hosp. East, 34 F.3d 605 (8th Cir. 1994), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 1361 (1995); City of Anaheim
v. Southern CA Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1992); Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. CSX
Transp., 924 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 814 (1991); McKenzie v. Mercy
Hosp. of Independence Kansas, 854 F.2d 365 (10th Cir. 1988).
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makes a facility essential.
III. DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF ESSENTIALITY
A. Essential to the Public
Some courts have forced owners to share a facility because the public
at large required access to a vital good or service.' To gain an
understanding of this approach, it is necessary to begin with the seminal
case, United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n,21 which engendered the
principle of sharing that now forms the purpose behind the essential
facility doctrine. The Terminal Association consisted of a group of firms
in St. Louis that controlled access to the only two railroad bridges which
spanned the Mississippi river.' The Supreme Court held that the
Terminal Association must provide access on "just and reasonable
terms" to all those railroad companies desiring to use the bridges.'
In ordering this unique remedy, the Supreme Court noted the
"topographical condition peculiar to the locality."'24 Because there were
no other alternatives to the bridges, the Court held that the Terminal
Association must act as "the impartial agent of all who, owing to the
conditions, are under such compulsion, as here exists, to use its
facilities."'  Indeed, public access to the bridges were an absolute
necessity because of the lay of the land. This idea of public necessity is
further demonstrated by the great number of people affected by the
restriction on interstate commerce.26  Twenty-four railroad lines
converged at the gateway city of St. Louis, the hub of our growing
nation's commerce.27
Further support for using public need to define essentiality is found
in Associated Press v. United States." In this case, more than 1,200
newspapers formed a cooperative, the Associated Press, in order to
achieve efficiency in news reporting.29 Applicants however, were
denied admission to the Associated Press if they competed with
20. See, e.g., United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912); Associated Press
v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
21. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
22. Id. at 391.
23. 1d at 411.
24. Id. at 404.
25. Id. at 405.
26. Id. at 405.
27. Id. at 395.
28. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
29. Id. at 4.
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members ° The Supreme Court held that the Associated Press must
provide equal access to the cooperative.31
Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion, believed that such an
association was vital to the public interest. Frankfurter noted that the
Associated Press:
has a relation to the public interest unlike that of any other
enterprise pursued for profit. A free press is indispensable to the
workings of our democratic society. The business of the press,
and therefore the business of the Associated Press, is the
promotion of truth regarding public matters by furnishing the
basis for an understanding of them. 2
Indeed, the public depends on the unimpeded, free "flow of news."33
Frankfurter even anticipated the objections of those who criticized the
Court for treating the Associated Press as a public utility. Responding
to such criticism, Frankfurter wrote, "[t]he relation of such restraints
upon access to news and the relation of such access to the function of a
free press in our democratic society must not be obscured by the
specialized notions that have gathered around the legal concept of
'public utility."'34  Because the public relied on the free flow of
information, the Associated Press, like the bridges in Terminal Railroad
Ass'n, was essential to the entire nation.
The third Supreme Court decision offering support for a definition
of "essential" based on public need is Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States.35 Several cities brought suit against Otter Tail, an electric utility
company, which refused to sell or wheel power to local municipal
distribution systems.36 The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's
order enjoining Otter Tail from refusing to wheel or sell power to the
municipalities.37 In this case, the duty to share a facility was imposed
on a public utility that supplied electricity.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 21.
32. Id. at 28-9 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 29.
34. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 29 (1945) (Frankfurtter, J. concurring).
35. 410 U.S. 366, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 910 (1973).
36. Id. at 368.
37. Id. at 376.
1997] 1121
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Such a concern for the public is manifested in other decisions in
which courts have declined to apply the doctrine for policy reasons. In
Pontius v. Children's Hospital,38 the district court declared that the
essential facility doctrine should not apply to decisions about hospital
staff privileges. Similarly, in Robles v. Humana Hosp. Cartersville,39 the
court stated that it is "inappropriate to apply a doctrine which would
prevent a hospital from keeping doctors it had adjudged unqualified off
its staff. Neither public policy nor the Sherman Act can countenance
such a result."'0
The fourth element of the MCI test, "the feasibility of providing the
facility,"41 offers further proof that public policy should determine what
is essential. Indeed, the courts have interpreted the fourth element to
mean that a firm does not have a duty to share a facility if the firm has
a valid business justification.42 In Anaheim, the Ninth Circuit did not
require a firm to share a facility when such a remedy would cause
customer rates to increase.43 The court noted that there is no duty to
share in this case because the "public interest is well served" by the
lowest possible rates.'
B. Essential to Competition
The purpose of the essential facility doctrine flows from the Otter
Tail decision in which the Supreme Court noted its concern that Otter
Tail's market power in the transmission market was utilized to create a
monopoly in another market.45 Therefore, the doctrine of essential
facilities is intended to restrict a firm from extending "monopoly power
from one stage of production to another, and from one market into
another."46 The Ninth Circuit stated that unless the facility "is used to
improperly interfere with competition, it cannot be called essential."47
38. 552 F. Supp. 1352, 1370 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
39. 785 F. Supp. 989, 995 (N.D. Ga. 1992).
40. ld. at 995-96 (quoting Pontius, 552 F. Supp. at 1370).
41. MCI Communications Corp. v. American TeL & TeL Co., 708 F.2d
1081, 1131 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
42. City of Anaheim v. Southern California Edison Co., 955 F. 2d 1373, 1380 (9th Cir.
1992).
43. Id. at 1380.
44. Id. at 1381.
45. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377-79, reh'g denied, 411 U.S.
910 (1973).
46. Anaheim, 955 F.2d at 1379 (quoting MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel.
& Tel., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983)).
47. Anaheim, 955 F.2d at 1380.
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Areeda understands that there are three parts to any determination
of what it means to be essential. First, a facility is essential if "the
plaintiff is essential for competition in the marketplace."" Second, the
facility must be essential to the individual competitor. A facility is
"critical to the plaintiffs competitive vitality" if the plaintiff cannot
effectively compete without that facility.49 Third, duplication of the
facility and practical alternatives must not be available.5 All too often,
however, courts and attorneys only focus on one of the three factors.
1. The Moral Hazard of Defining Essential as merely "Essential to
the Competitor"
Attorneys have creatively used the word "essential" to describe the
competitor's need. William Tye argues in his essay, "Competitive Access:
A Comparative Industry Approach to the Essential Facility Doctrine" that
application of the doctrine often "focuses unduly on the effect of the
denial of access on the plaintiff's ability to compete-not on the
infringement of competition which is the objective of the antitrust
law."'" Indeed, the purpose of antitrust law is not to protect "competi-
tion as a process of rivalry," but to protect "competition as a means of
promoting economic efficiency."52  Consequently, the purpose of
antitrust law in protecting competition as a whole is contradicted when
the needs of an individual competitor define the meaning of essential.
Part of the reason why courts have begun using essential to define a
competitor's need stems from the Supreme Court decision in Otter
Tail." While United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n54 and Associat-
ed Press v. United States5 involved concerted action under section one
of the Sherman Act,56 the Supreme Court in Otter Tail57 extended the
48. Areeda, supra note 8, at 852.
49. Id
50. Id.
51. Tye, supra note 8, at 345.
52. State of Ill. ex rel Burris v. Panhandle Eastern, 935 F.2d 1469, 1483 (7th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094 (1992) (quoting Olympia Equip. Leasing v. Western Union
Telegraph, 797 F.2d 370, 375 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 48 U.S. 934 (1987)).
53. 410 U.S. 366, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 910,(1973).
54. 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
55. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
56. The Sherman Act, section 1, states:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
1997] 1123
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duty of sharing to unilateral action under section two of the Sherman
Act. 8
There exists a moral hazard when plaintiffs bring an essential facility
claim against a single competitor. Indeed, firms might try to use the
doctrine to take a "free ride" on the efforts of a competitor.59 Without
a firm statement of what the word essential means, plaintiffs will
continue to argue that a rival's facility is essential to the plaintiff's needs.
Several cases offer an example of the dangerous possibility that a
competitor will take a free ride. In Twin Lab. v. Weider Health &
Fitness,6' Twin Lab. and Weider both produced nutritional supplements
for bodybuilders.61 Weider however, owned two widely-read bodybuild-
ing magazines.6' Because Twin Lab. owned a magazine with a substan-
tially smaller circulation, Twin Lab. argued that Weider's magazines were
essential facilities such that Weider should offer Twin Lab. advertising
space in Weider's magazines.6 The court held that Weider's magazines
were not essential facilities.'
Similarly, in Olympia Equip. Leasing v. Western Union Telegraph,5
Olympia argued that Western Union's sales force was an essential
facility.66 Olympia reasoned that no company could compete with an
established firm such as Western Union if it did not add Olympia's name
to the list of suppliers that Western Union distributed to its own
customers.67 The Seventh Circuit held that the essential facility doctrine
$10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment
not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1990).
57. 410 U.S. 366, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 910 (1973).
58. The Sherman Act, section 2, states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
$10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment
not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1990).
59. Id
60. 900 F.2d 566 (2nd Cir. 1990).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 569.
65. 797 F.2d 370 (7th Cir.), reh'g denied, 802 F.2d 217 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 934
(1987).
66. Id. at 377.
67. It
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does not "imply a duty in existing firms" to inform their customers about
a new firm.18
2. Inability to Duplicate the Facility
Many courts boil the issue of essentiality down to whether the facility
is capable of replication. The Tenth Circuit stated that, "[a]s the word
essential indicates, [a plaintiff] must show more than inconvenience or
even some economic loss; [he] must show an alternative to the facility is
not feasible."69  Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has deemed a facility
essential "if duplication of the facility would be economically infeasible
and if denial of its use inflicts a severe handicap on potential market
entrants."'7  According to the Ninth Circuit, the second element of
MCI, the inability to duplicate,71 is "effectively part of the definition of
what is an essential facility in the first place."72
Critics have noted the unfairness of this approach to the essential
facility doctrine.73 Scott Makar argues in his essay, "The Essential
Facility Doctrine and the Health Care Industry,' 74 that "[e]quating
'inability to practicably duplicate' with 'essentiality' can unjustifiably
infer that an existing facility is 'essential' simply because one competitor
cannot 'practically' duplicate it."'75 Tye argues that it is absurd to
declare a facility essential merely because it cannot be reasonably
duplicated.76 Carrying this principle to its logical extreme "would require
any restaurant with empty tables to be forced to include on its menu the
offerings of an outside sidewalk hot-dog vendor if the vendor could not
itself supply seating for its customers elsewhere at lower cost. '7 7 These
critics emphasize that there are no bright line rules for determining when
a facility is incapable of duplication or when alternatives are impractical.
68. ld.
69. City of Chanute, Kansas v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 955 F.2d 641,648 (10th Cir.),
cert denied, 506 U.S. 831 (1992) (quoting Twin Labs. Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900
F.2d 566, 570 (2d Cir. 1990)).
70. Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520,539 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting Hecht v. Pro-
Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cerL denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978)).
71. MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
72. City of Anaheim v. Southern California Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1380 (9th Cir.
1992).
73. See Makar, supra note 8, at 922-23; Tye, supra note 8, at 347-48.
74. Makar, supra note 8, at 913.
75. Id. at 922.
76. Tye, supra note 8, at 348 n.41.
77. Id.
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C. Essentialitly Equals Market Power
Professor Hovenkamp notes that "a properly defined essential facility
must define a relevant market.""8 If a "facility does not constitute or
control a relevant market, then competitive alternatives are available and
the facility can hardly be characterized as 'essential.' 79 Some courts
have defined an essential facility by that facility's market power. In Blue
Cross, the court held that the Clinic was not an essential facility because
it did not even control fifty percent "of any properly defined market."8
Similarly, in Castelli v. Meadville Medical Center,81 the Third Circuit
held that a hospital was not essential because of the existence of other
hospitals in the market.'
Because of this reliance on markets in defining what is essential, the
danger exists that the plaintiff may try to manipulate the geographic and
product markets in order to make the defendant's facility essential. The
best example of market manipulation occurs in Blue Cross. Blue Cross
drew "a dizzying series of concentric circles around the Clinic's [satellite]
offices" in order to demonstrate that the Clinic's doctors were the only
physicians in a certain area. 3 In addition to gerrymandering the
geographical markets, Blue Cross tried to show monopoly control of
"very narrowly defined medical procedures, called 'Diagnostic Related
Groups. ,, 84
In McKenzie v. Mercy Hosp. of Independence Kan.,85 the plaintiff,
a doctor, continually redefined the scope of his essential facilities
argument. In his complaint, the plaintiff applied the essential facilities
78. HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, § 7.7 at 274.
79. Id.
80. Blue Cross, 65 F.3d at 1413. While the court concluded that the Clinic had a
"monopoly market share of the HMO 'market' the court stated that the HMO market is "not
a proper market." Id. Blue Cross & Blue Shield has filed a petition for Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court on the issue of whether HMOs are separate markets or
merely part of the overall health care financing market.
81. 702 F. Supp. 1201 (W.D. Pa. 1988), affd, 872 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1989).
82. Id
83. Blue Cross, 65 F.3d at 1411. The court noted that the "Clinic employs all the
physicians in Marshfield itself and in several other towns-but one of these towns has only one
physician-and all the physicians in one entire county-but a county that has only 12 physi-
cians." Id. at 1409.
84. Id at 1411. These Diagnostic Related Groups defined separate markets for
"circumcision of a male 17 years old or older, circumcision of a male under 17, hysterectomy,
and reconstructive surgery for the uterine system ... ." Id
85. 854 F.2d 365 (10th Cir. 1988).
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doctrine to the "entire hospital.,8 6  Later in the proceedings, the
plaintiff declared that only "obstetrical care and emergency care" were
essential facilities.' Finally, the essential facility description changed
again such that the district court limited its essential facility analysis to
the emergency room only.88
E. Essential Because of Consumer Preferences
A few courts have considered consumer preferences in deciding
whether a facility is essential. The risk inherent in this approach flows
from the application of the essential facility doctrine to unilateral action
under section one of the Sherman Act. Because a plaintiff may bring an
action against a single competitor, courts must engage in a comparison
of two competing facilities. When comparing two facilities, the danger
exists that a court might deem a facility essential merely because the
customer likes the defendant's facility better than the plaintiff's.
1. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
In Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing, 9 two skiing
companies offered a discounted six-day lift ticket that covered the three
mountains owned by Aspen Skiing Co. and one mountain owned by
Highlands.9" Highlands brought suit when Aspen Skiing Co. began
selling a three-mountain ticket instead of the four-mountain ticket which
included Highland's mountain. 9' The Supreme Court upheld the jury's
verdict that the four mountain ticket was an essential facility.9"
The Court acknowledged that customers preferred the "flexibility"
and the increased "number of challenging runs available.., during the
week's vacation."'93 The Court noted that consumer surveys indicated
that over fifty-percent of those responding to the survey wanted to ski
Highlands, but would not if it was left off the ticket.94
Somehow this analysis of consumer preference is justified because it
focuses on the popularity of the plaintiff's facility. In two other cases,
however, the Seventh Circuit considered the popularity of the defen-
86. Iat at 369.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
90. 1& at 590.
91. IM at 593.
92. 1& at 611.
93. Ida at 606.
94. Id.
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dant's facility in determining whether the facility was essential.
2. Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz
In Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz,95 a group of investors led by Fishman
attempted to purchase the Chicago Bulls.96 The NBA Board of
Governors did not approve the sale to Fishman because he had not
secured a lease with Chicago Stadium.' A second group of investors
was successful in gaining the NBA's approval to buy the Chicago Bulls
because a member of this group, Wirtz, owned Chicago Stadium.9"
Fishman brought suit against Wirtz, claiming that Fishman was unfairly
denied access to Chicago Stadium, an essential facility.99
In determining that Chicago Stadium was an essential facility, the
district court compared the Stadium with another indoor stadium in
Chicago, the Amphitheatre. The court found that the Stadium had a
greater seating capacity and better lighting for television.' The
district court qualified its reliance on consumer preferences by "[c]onced-
ing that a facility is not essential merely because it is better than or
preferable to another .... .,"" The court concluded, however, "that
the stadium was not just better-it was 'unique. ' 1 °2
Unlike the district court, the Seventh Circuit expressed no reserva-
tions about using consumer preferences to affirm the decision that
Chicago Stadium was, in fact, an essential facility. In response to Wirtz's
argument that a finding of essentiality should only be based on
"objective economic reality," the Court of Appeals acknowledged that
"'objective economic reality' is often a function of personal preferenc-
es. °10 3 The court added that the market power of the Stadium was a
function of the "'personal preferences' of basketball patrons.""
Therefore, the court concluded, "preferences are relevant" in ascertain-
ing whether a facility like Chicago Stadium is essential.05
95. 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986).
96. Id. at 525.
97. 1& at 527.
98. Id. at 529.
99. Id. at 530.
100. Id. at 539.
101. Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 539 (7th Cir. 1986).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 540.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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3. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Marshfield Clinic
Such reliance on the quality and popularity of the defendant's facility
was completely rejected in Blue Cross.1" Blue Cross argued that the
Clinic and its doctors were essential facilities because of their reputation
as the best. Indeed Blue Cross argued "that the Clinic's reputation is so
superb that no one will sign up with an HMO or preferred-provider plan
that does not have the Clinic on its roster."' 7 Recognizing that such
reliance on consumer preferences has no place in antitrust analysis, the
court stated that "[t]he suggestion that the price of being 'best' is to be
brought under the regulatory aegis of antitrust law and stripped of your
power to decide whom to do business with does not identify an interest
that the antitrust laws protect.'O'
As the court in Blue Cross makes clear, consumer preferences should
not determine what facilities are essential. However, without a uniform
definition of what it means to be "essential," evidence of reputation and
popularity may filter into the essentiality equation.
III. ESSENTIALITY REQUIRES COMPARISON
With no direction from the Supreme Court and no consistency among
the circuits, the courts are floundering in their attempt to define an
essential facility. The courts have no mechanism for distinguishing which
facilities should and should not be subject to the four-part test for
liability found in MCL A uniform definition of "essential" that is based
on public necessity should eliminate many of the problems inherent in
the definitions based on competition, consumer preferences, and market
power.
A. A Uniform Definition of "Essential"
Gregory Werden argues, in his essay, The Law and Economics of the
Essential Facility Doctrine,"° that the legislative and administrative
branches of government should determine what facilities are essen-
tial."' Indeed, Werden would not invoke the essential facilities
doctrine "unless there is a pre-existing regulatory agency capable of
106. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995), petition
for cert filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3503 (Jan. 111996) (No. 95-1118).
107. Id. at 1413.
108. Id
109. Werden, supra note 8, at 433.
110. Id. at 480.
1997] 1129
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
adequately supervising relief ... ,," If the legislature has not seen fit
to regulate an industry, then the facilities within that industry are not
essential. Lawrence Sullivan also details a "'public utility' approach" to
the essential facility doctrine."2 Sullivan understands Terminal Rail-
road Ass'n and Otter Tail as creating a rule that "treats scarce resource
or natural advantage monopolies the way regulatory law treats a public
utility.""' 3 Sullivan notes that these cases impose a duty on essential
facilities that resembles the two duties imposed on a public utility, "a
duty to provide reasonable service and nondiscriminatory access, and a
duty to charge no higher than reasonable prices."" 4
A uniform definition of "essential" flows from the public utility
approaches endorsed by Werden and Sullivan. Indeed, the public need
should define what is essential. Therefore, as a prerequisite to applying
the test for liability in MCI, a court should determine whether the
public's need for access to the facility justifies treating that facility as a
public utility.
The Seventh Circuit's latest pronouncement on the doctrine offers
some support for the public utility approach. In response to Blue Cross'
contention that the Marshfield Clinic "restricted staff privileges" at
hospitals which the Clinic controlled, the Seventh Circuit held that
"[h]ospitals are not public utilities, required to grant staff privileges to
anyone with a medical license.""' Indeed, this Comment argues that
courts should compare the public's need for the facility in question with
the public's need for regulated utilities such as electricity or water. For
example, in Marshfield Clinic, the Seventh Circuit implied that health
care is not as essential as electricity. In some ways, courts already
engage in such comparisons. In Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America
Online, Inc., a federal district court considered whether an e-mail service
was an essential facility.'16 The district court held that e-mail was not
like a railroad terminal or a telephone communications facility."7
111. Id.
112. LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 48,
126 (1977).
113. Id. § 48, at 125.
114. Id. § 48, at 126.
115. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1413 (7th Cir. 1995),
petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3503 (Jan. 11 1996) (No. 95-1118).
116. 948 F. Supp. 456, 463 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
117. Id.
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B. Public Policy vs. Economic Analysis
This uniform definition of "essential" necessarily involves a consider-
ation of public policy. One commentator, however, has urged a strict
economic approach to the essential facilities doctrine. Makar argues that
pure reliance on public policy has no place in the essential facility
doctrine."' Makar believes that it is "unfortunate" when the courts
consider public policy instead of economic factors when applying the
doctrine of essential facilities. 9 Makar argues that the courts should
conduct an "economic balancing of the pro-competitive and anti-
competitive effects of exclusion."'"
Mere reliance on economic factors, however, overlooks the fact that
public policy in Terminal Railroad Ass'n engendered the essential facility
doctrine in the first place. The MCI test for liability rightly involves an
analysis of economic factors, however, the initial determination of what
is essential has very little to do with economics. Indeed, courts must
consider public policy in determining the "kinds of facilities one is
entitled to keep for oneself.' 21
C. Fairness Under Section Two of the Sherman Act
There is something fundamentally fair about forcing a group of firms
under section one of the Sherman Act to share a facility that is necessary
for all. In Terminal Railroad Ass'n, the Supreme Court underscored this
notion of fairness when it noted that a necessary facility, such as the only
two bridges spanning the Mississippi river, should not be exclusively
owned and controlled by "less than all of the companies under compul-
sion to use them .... ,", Indeed, no one questions the application of
the essential facilities doctrine to concerted action under section one of
the Sherman Act. Areeda notes that the concerted action itself may be
"evidence of essentiality" because it demonstrates not only the impor-
tance of the venture, but also that such a venture is "beyond the
individual capacity of the collaborators."''
When applied to the conduct of a single firm under section two of the
Sherman Act, support for the essential facilities doctrine waivers for a
118. Makar, supra note 8, at 939.
119. a.
120. Id. at 919.
121. Areeda, supra, note 8, at 851.
122. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 409 (1912).
123. Areeda, supra note 8, at 845.
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variety of reasons. Areeda notes that the doctrine cannot automatically
apply to the conduct of a single firm because such unilateral action is
"omnipresent" and difficult to remedy.124  Indeed, as previously
discussed, if a firm can bring an action against a single competitor, the
risk is that the firm may try to take a free ride on that competitor's
efforts.
However, a uniform definition of an essential facility, based on public
policy considerations, ensures a measure of fairness when the essential
facility doctrine is applied to the unilateral action of a single firm under
section two of the Sherman Act. Indeed, by focusing only on those
facilities that are truly essential to the public, one eliminates the
incentive to sue a competitor just because that competitor has a better
facility.
D. Elimination of Consumer Preferences
The most disturbing aspect of the essential facilities doctrine is that
some courts have relied on consumer preferences in determining what
is essential. Tye argues that the antitrust law "would be stood on its
head" if firms had "an obligation to affirmatively take steps to achieve
the success of a competitor."" By creating a uniform definition of
essential that relies solely on the public's need for that facility, courts can
eliminate considerations of consumer preferences.
E. Elimination of Market Power Considerations
By defining the word "essential" in relation to the public interest, one
eliminates any considerations of market power in determining what is
essential. Note however, that if a court finds that a facility is essential,
the court must still apply the MCI liability test. The first element in
MCI requires a finding by the court that the owner of the facility be a
"monopolist.""2 6  Consequently, the court must still consider market
power in deciding whether liability attaches to the owner of the essential
facility.
IV. CONCLUSION
Amazingly enough, the essential facilities doctrine is almost 85 years
124. Id. at 844.
125. Tye, supra note 8, at 348 n. 41.
126. MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
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old and there is still no consensus about what it means to be essential.
Because the Supreme Court has never specifically addressed this
doctrine, the circuit courts' need a uniform definition of "essential."
Indeed, a facility is truly essential when public necessity justifies treating
that facility as a public utility. The duty to share a facility should only
arise when occasioned by the needs of the public. Consequently, the
needs of the competitor, the preferences of the consumer, and the
analysis of the market are all irrelevant in determining what facilities are
so essential that they must be shared.
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